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Abstract 
Objectives: Firearms experts traditionally have testified that a weapon leaves “unique” toolmarks, so 
bullets or cartridge casings can be visually examined and conclusively matched to a particular firearm. 
Recently, due to scientific critiques, Department of Justice policy, and judges’ rulings, firearms experts 
have tempered their conclusions. In two experiments, we tested whether this ostensibly more cautious 
language has its intended effect on jurors (Experiment 1), and whether cross-examination impacts jurors’ 
perception of firearm testimony (Experiment 2). Hypotheses: Four hypotheses were tested. First, jurors 
will accord significant weight to firearm testimony that declares a “match” compared to testimony that 
does not (Experiments 1 and 2). Second, variations to “match” language will not affect guilty verdicts 
(Experiment 1). Third, only the most cautious language (“cannot exclude the gun”) would lower guilty 
verdicts (Experiment 1). Fourth, cross-examination will reduce guilty verdicts depending on specific 
language used (Experiment 2). Method: In two preregistered, high-powered experiments with 200 mock 
jurors per cell, participants recruited from Qualtrics Panels were presented with a criminal case 
containing firearms evidence, which varied the wording of the examiner’s conclusion and whether cross-
examination was present. These variations include conclusion language used by practitioners, language 
advised by government organizations, and language required by judges in several cases. Participants 
gave a verdict, rated the evidence and expert in all conditions. Results: Guilty verdicts significantly 
increased when a match was declared compared to when a match was not declared. Variation in 
conclusion language did not affect guilty verdicts nor did it affect jurors’ estimates of the likelihood the 
defendant’s gun fired the bullet recovered at the crime scene. In contrast, however, a more cautious 
conclusion that an examiner “cannot exclude the defendant’s gun” did significantly reduce guilty verdicts 
and likelihood estimates alike. The presence of cross-examination did not affect these findings. 
Conclusion: Apart from the most limited language (“cannot exclude the defendant’s gun”), judicial 
intervention to limit firearms conclusion language is not likely to produce its intended effect. Moreover, 
cross-examination does not appear to affect perceptions or individual juror verdicts. 
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Objectives: Firearms experts traditionally have testified that a weapon leaves “unique” toolmarks, so
bullets or cartridge casings can be visually examined and conclusively matched to a particular firearm.
Recently, due to scientific critiques, Department of Justice policy, and judges’ rulings, firearms experts
have tempered their conclusions. In two experiments, we tested whether this ostensibly more cautious
language has its intended effect on jurors (Experiment 1), and whether cross-examination impacts jurors’
perception of firearm testimony (Experiment 2). Hypotheses: Four hypotheses were tested. First, jurors
will accord significant weight to firearm testimony that declares a “match” compared to testimony that
does not (Experiments 1 and 2). Second, variations to “match” language will not affect guilty verdicts
(Experiment 1). Third, only the most cautious language (“cannot exclude the gun”) would lower guilty
verdicts (Experiment 1). Fourth, cross-examination will reduce guilty verdicts depending on specific
language used (Experiment 2). Method: In two preregistered, high-powered experiments with 200 mock
jurors per cell, participants recruited from Qualtrics Panels were presented with a criminal case
containing firearms evidence, which varied the wording of the examiner’s conclusion and whether
cross-examination was present. These variations include conclusion language used by practitioners,
language advised by government organizations, and language required by judges in several cases.
Participants gave a verdict, rated the evidence and expert in all conditions. Results: Guilty verdicts
significantly increased when a match was declared compared to when a match was not declared.
Variation in conclusion language did not affect guilty verdicts nor did it affect jurors’ estimates of the
likelihood the defendant’s gun fired the bullet recovered at the crime scene. In contrast, however, a
more cautious conclusion that an examiner “cannot exclude the defendant’s gun” did significantly reduce
guilty verdicts and likelihood estimates alike. The presence of cross-examination did not affect these
findings. Conclusion: Apart from the most limited language (“cannot exclude the defendant’s gun”),
judicial intervention to limit firearms conclusion language is not likely to produce its intended effect.
Moreover, cross-examination does not appear to affect perceptions or individual juror verdicts.
Public Significance Statement
This study addresses mounting legal concerns regarding the overstated conclusions experts reach
using firearms comparison, one of the most commonly used forensic disciplines in criminal cases.
Bradley D. McAuliff served as Action Editor.
X Brandon L. Garrett, School of Law, Duke University; X Nicholas Scurich,
Department of Psychological Science and Criminology, Law and Society, Uni-
versity of California, Irvine; X William E. Crozier, School of Law, Duke Uni-
versity.
This work was funded by the Center for Statistics and Applications in
Forensic Evidence through Cooperative Agreement 70NANB20H019 be-
tween the National Institute of Standards and Technology and Iowa State
University, which includes activities carried out at Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity; Duke University; University of California, Irvine; University of
Virginia; West Virginia University; University of Pennsylvania; Swarth-
more College; and University of Nebraska, Lincoln. The authors have no
conflicts of interest to report. All materials, data, analyses, results, and
preregistration are available on the Open Science Framework (Study 1:
https://osf.io/7kb43/; Study 2: https://osf.io/gkjts/). The findings in this
article have not been previously presented.
The data are available at https://osf.io/qfsc3/?view_only5f34d29b870b
4adeb9f15d87dc23392a
The experiment materials are available at https://osf.io/qfsc3/?view_
only5f34d29b870b4adeb9f15d87dc23392a
The preregistered design and analysis plan is accessible at https://osf
.io/qfsc3/?view_only5f34d29b870b4adeb9f15d87dc23392a
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Nicholas
Scurich, Department of Psychological Science and Criminology, Law
and Society, University of California, Irvine, 4213 Social and Behav-
ioral Sciences Gateway, Irvine, CA 92697-7085. E-mail: nscurich@
uci.edu
While judges and prosecutors have required experts to use more modest phrasing in their conclusions,
the effectiveness of those changes was unknown. This study found such changes largely ineffective,
suggesting more aggressive regulation is needed to prevent jurors and legal actors from misunder-
standing firearms evidence.
Keywords: forensic science, expert testimony, error rates, juror decision-making, firearms
Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000423.supp
Firearms violence is a sizable problem in the United States, with
over 10,000 homicides involving firearms and almost 500,000
other crimes, such as robberies and assaults, committed using
firearms each year (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2018; Bureau
of Justice Statistics, 2011). For that reason, firearms comparisons
are in great demand as one of the most commonly performed
forensic analysis. Such forensic comparisons seek to potentially
link crime scene evidence, such as spent cartridge casings or
bullets, with a particular firearm. For over a hundred years, fire-
arms experts have testified in criminal trials in the United States
(Lanigan, 2012). Firearms experts traditionally testify in court that
a weapon will leave toolmarks on ammunition fired, so that bullets
or cartridge casings can be visually examined and then conclu-
sively matched to a firearm. By the late 1990s, such testimony was
premised on a “theory of identification” promulgated by a profes-
sional association, the Association of Firearms and Tool Mark
Examiners (AFTE). AFTE currently instructs practitioners to use
the term “identification” to explain what it means when they
identify “sufficient agreement” when comparing cartridge casings
or bullets, based on the “examiner’s training and experience”
(AFTE, 1998, 2020).
Criticism of forensic science by academics is not new (Kennedy,
2003; see generally Mnookin, Cole, Dror, & Fisher, 2010). In
recent years, however, authoritative scientific organizations have
called into question the validity and the reliability of such cate-
gorical testimony regarding firearms comparison evidence. In a
2008 report on ballistic imaging, the National Academy of Sci-
ences concluded that definitive associations of that type were not
supported (National Research Council, 2008). In a 2009 report
covering a broad range of forensic disciplines, the National Acad-
emy of Sciences stated that such categorical conclusions regarding
firearms or toolmarks were not supported by research, and that
instead, more cautious comparative claims should be made (Na-
tional Research Council, 2008). The report stated that the “scien-
tific knowledge base for tool mark and firearms analysis is fairly
limited” (p. 155). The report noted that an examiner makes “a
subjective decision based on unarticulated standards and no sta-
tistical foundation for estimation of error rates” (pp. 153–154). The
National Academy of Sciences report added that the AFTE theory
of identification is inadequate and does not explain how an expert
can reach a given level of confidence in a conclusion. Going
farther, the report of the President’s Council of Advisors on
Science and Technology (2016), after reviewing the extant studies
of firearm examiner performance, found firearms comparison
methods not foundationally valid.
Anticipating some of these concerns, several judges have inter-
vened to limit the scope of expert testimony concerning firearms,
although no judge in the United States has excluded firearms
testimony altogether. For example, judges have required that ex-
aminers opine only that it is “more likely than not” that the
ammunition could have come from the defendant’s firearm
(United States v. Glynn, 2008). Others have required that the
examiner limit conclusions to a “reasonable degree of ballistic
certainty” (United States v. Monteiro, 2006; United States v. Diaz,
2007). Another judge limited testimony to observing that the
markings were “consistent” (United States v. Willock, 2010).
In January 2019, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) re-
sponded to these concerns and announced new guidelines for
firearms testimony, stating that firearms experts cannot testify in
federal case that toolmarks originated from the same source, to the
exclusion of all others. Instead, an expert should testify as to a
“source identification.” That is defined as follows:
“Source identification” is an examiner’s conclusion that two toolmarks
originated from the same source. This conclusion is an examiner’s
decision that all observed class characteristics are in agreement and the
quality and quantity of corresponding individual characteristics is such
that the examiner would not expect to find that same combination of
individual characteristics repeated in another source and has found insuf-
ficient disagreement of individual characteristics to conclude they origi-
nated from different sources. (U. S. DOJ, 2019, p. 2)
In one of the most far-reaching judicial rulings to date, the
firearm expert was restricted to a conclusion that he “cannot
exclude” the relevant firearm as the source of the fired cartridge
casings (United States v. Tibbs, 2019). The judge in that case was
concerned that the evidence not be barred: “I want to make clear
I am not excluding specialized opinion testimony in the area of
firearms and toolmark examination as a whole, or finding that the
entire discipline lacks foundational reliability” (United States v.
Tibbs, 2019, p. 57). The judge explained in more detail what this
“cannot exclude” restriction means in practice for the expert:
He [the firearm examiner] will be able to describe the work he did and
the comparisons he made. He can make, as the defense concedes, a
comparison based on class characteristics and he can conclude that
based on his examination the recovered firearm cannot be excluded as
the source of the shell casings found on the scene of the alleged
shooting.
He cannot state an ultimate conclusion in different or stronger terms,
and he cannot state that individual marks are unique to a particular
firearm such that an identification could be made. (United States v.
Tibbs, 2019, p. 58)
It is unknown, however, whether these efforts by judges and
federal prosecutors to limit firearms testimony affects how jurors
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evaluate such testimony. Research has been done on a range of
other forensic techniques, including DNA testimony involving
statistical methods, as well as traditional forensics like latent
fingerprint comparisons in which experts traditionally offer “iden-
tification” conclusions (Schklar & Diamond, 1999; Scurich &
John, 2013; Thompson, Kaasa, & Peterson, 2013). As a general
matter, the laity views forensic science as highly accurate and
persuasive (see Lieberman, Carrell, Miethe, & Krauss, 2008), and
is generally insensitive to variations in the way in which a “match”
is communicated in non-numeric terms (Thompson & Newman,
2015; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, 2009). For example, prior re-
search has found that jurors place great weight on fingerprint
evidence and regard it as accurate and reliable, regardless of
whether the expert expresses conclusions in more certain or more
cautious terms, such as a simple match, a match individualized to
the defendant, a match made to a scientific certainty, or a match
individualized to the defendant that is practically impossible to
have come from any other person (Garrett & Mitchell, 2013;
Garrett, Mitchell, & Scurich, 2018). However, there is some evi-
dence to suggest that the weight mock jurors place on forensic
evidence varies depending on the forensic discipline (Garrett,
Crozier, & Grady, 2020; Ribeiro, Tangen, & McKimmie, 2019).
Thus, it is important to understand how laypeople weigh non-
numeric conclusions for firearms testimony.
Study 1
Despite its common use and importance in criminal trials, how-
ever, little empirical research has been done to on the impact of
firearms testimony on jurors. In fact, the only empirical study on
the perception of firearm examiners was conducted by Saks and
Wissler in 1984. That study simply asked participants (n  97) to
rate the competence and likelihood they would agree with different
types of experts (ratings were made on a 1–10 scale with 10
indicating the highest competence/likelihood of agreement); fire-
arm examiners received the third highest overall ratings (mean
competence rating  7.80; mean likelihood of agreement rating 
7.62). Only medical doctors and chemical/drug experts received
higher ratings.
The study by Saks and Wissler (1984) is consistent with the
notion that jurors perceive firearm testimony to be powerful evi-
dence. However, the study leaves open many unanswered ques-
tions. First, would the gist of the findings replicate 35 years later
on a broader sample of adults? It seems plausible that views about
forensic science may have changed in the interim, perhaps due to
changes in the manner in which forensic science is portrayed in the
media (see Tyler, 2005). Second, although it is clear that partici-
pants in the study indicated that they are likely to agree with the
testimony of a firearm examiner in general, would jurors agree
with any particular firearm examiner testimony in the context of a
criminal trial? This distinction between anticipated and actual
behavior could tested by viewing the behavior of jurors after
receiving firearm testimony or not. Finally, would variations in the
language used by a firearm examiner to characterize a “match”
impact how jurors evaluate firearm evidence and in turn influence
their verdicts? This question is particularly germane in light of the
recent reforms to curtail the language used by firearm examiners in
actual court proceedings.
The present studies seek to address these lacunae. Specifically,
in this study a large, nationally representative sample of mock
jurors was presented with a criminal case in which a firearm expert
drew a conclusion regarding his analysis of the casing recovered
from the crime scene and the defendant’s gun. In Study 1, the
language he used to characterize the match was experimentally
manipulated. Participants were then furnished with judicial in-
structions on the standard of proof, and asked them to render a
verdict on whether to convict and the defendant or not, rate the
quality of the evidence, the expert, and other aspects of the case.
Study 2 first attempted to replicate the principal findings in Study
1 on the effect of different language, and also tested what impact
if any cross-examination might have—either alone or in combi-
nation (i.e., an interaction) with the variations in language used to
describe the match.
Hypotheses
Three main hypotheses are put forth for Study 1:
Hypothesis 1: Consistent with how the laity views forensic
science in general (Lieberman, Carrell, Miethe, & Krauss,
2008), and firearm experts in particular (Saks & Wissler,
1984), we hypothesized that jurors will accord significant
weight to firearm testimony that declares a “match” between
two cartridge casings. That is, guilty verdicts, and the likeli-
hood of the defendant’s guilt, would be higher for conclusions
that match the evidence casing to the defendant’s gun, com-
pared to a condition that does not conclude a match (i.e., an
Inconclusive result).
Hypothesis 2: Consistent with previous research finding that
variations to non-numeric language used to characterize a
“match” does not have an impact on juror’s evaluation of
fingerprint evidence (Garrett & Mitchell, 2013), we hypothe-
sized that variations to the language used by firearm examin-
ers to characterize a match would not affect guilty verdicts.
Hypothesis 3: We hypothesized that only the most cautious
language (i.e., “cannot exclude the gun”) would lower guilty
verdicts compared to other conclusion language.
The second hypothesis directly tests assumptions made by
judges and prosecutors that more limited, less certain language will
have a corresponding effect on jurors—the ultimate consumers of
firearm examiner testimony. We test several different variations to
the language, all of which come from case law or official organi-
zations, such as DOJ, that have authority and actually impact the
manner in which testimony is presented in court. In short, these
language variations have a high degree of ecological validity.
It is important to note that Hypothesis 2 predicts a null effect.
This prediction has its grounding in studies that also found a null
effect of “match” language used for other forms of forensic science
evidence (e.g., Garrett & Mitchell, 2013). Given that a null hy-
pothesis is predicted, it is extremely important to have sufficient
statistical power to detect an effect should such an effect actually
exist. An underpowered study might fail to reject the null hypoth-
esis—thus confirming our prediction of a null effect—simply
because it lacks the power to detect an effect. To minimize this
possibility, we opted to have a high-powered study that should be
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able to detect even small effects (assuming they do in fact exist).
As such, we elected to have 200 participants per cell, which
according to statistical power calculations is sufficient to detect a
small effect (d  0.35) with power  0.90 and   .05 using a
two-tailed t test for any differences between groups.
Method
Participants. One thousand four hundred twenty participants
were recruited using Qualtrics and completed the survey online.
Participants were terminated from the study and excluded from
analyses if they did not pass an instructional manipulation check to
assess attention or reading checks, if they were not a U.S. citizen,
or if they came from suspicious, duplicate geolocations (see Op-
penheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). The final sample was
comprised of 1420 participants aged 18–88 (Mdn  47, interquar-
tile range  28). The study was balanced with respect to gender
(48% self-identified as male; 52% as female). Participants self-
identified as 13% Black, 5% Asian, 60% White, 17% Hispanic,
1% Native American or Pacific Islander, and the rest selected
other. With respect to education, 65% had a 2-year college degree
or less, 25% had at least 4-year college degree, and 10% had a
postgraduate degree.
Participants were asked to self-identify their political prefer-
ences: 10.8% identified as “very conservative,” 18.1% identified
as “somewhat conservative,” 39.4% identified as “middle of the
road,” 19.2% identified as “somewhat liberal,” and 12.5 identified
as “very liberal.” Nineteen percent had a self-reported annual
household income of less than $20,000 and 15% had an income
above $100,000. Thirty-seven percent of the participants reported
having served previously on a jury.
Materials.
The case. Each participant read a synopsis of a criminal case
against a defendant for discharging a firearm in a public place.
The facts in the synopsis were adapted from an actual criminal
case (United States v. Driscoll, 2003). Briefly, the police arrested
the defendant (“Mr. Cole”) for firing a gun in an unsuccessful
convenience store robbery. The defendant in the case was charged
with willfully firing a firearm during the commission of a felony,
and attempted armed robbery. During the attempted convenience
store robbery, no one was hurt as the gun was fired into the floor;
the culprit fled and the clerk could not identify any person, as the
gunman wore a mask. However, two days later, during a routine
traffic stop, police pulled over the defendant and confiscated his
9-mm handgun, as a 9-mm bullet had been found at the crime
scene. The case materials did not include a cross-examination,
opening or closing arguments, or any witnesses or evidence beside
the firearm expert (see below). The length of the stimulus was
approximately 1,300 words. Full text can be found in the online
supplemental materials.
Direct examination of the firearm expert. In a question-and-
answer transcript format, a firearm expert detailed his experience,
firearm examination methodology, and his analysis in this case. He
then reached one of the seven possible conclusions:
1. Inconclusive: The examiner testified that “there was not
sufficient agreement among the characteristics to deter-
mine that the toolmarks have been produced by the same
tool.”
2. Cannot be excluded: The examiner testified “the defen-
dant’s gun cannot be excluded as the gun that fired the
bullet recovered at the crime scene,” which means that
“we observe some agreement of a combination of indi-
vidual characteristics suggesting that the toolmarks have
been produced by the same tool.”
3. Simple identification: The examiner testified that “I iden-
tified the crime scene bullet as having been fired by the
defendant’s gun.”
4. Ballistic certainty: The examiner testified that “I identi-
fied the crime scene bullet as having been fired by the
defendant’s gun,” and that this “means that the bullet
recovered from the crime scene was identified, to a
reasonable degree of ballistic certainty, as having come
from the defendant’s firearm (United States v. Diaz,
2007).
5. More likely than not: The examiner testified that “I
identified the crime scene bullet as having been fired by
the defendant’s gun” and that this “means that it is more
likely than not that the bullet recovered from the crime
scene came from the defendant’s firearm” (United States
v. Glynn, 2008).
6. Complete agreement: The examiner testified that “I con-
cluded that the crime scene bullet has markings consis-
tent with being fired by the defendant’s gun,” and that
this “means that when I looked at the class characteristics
of the bullet recovered from the crime scene and a bullet
fired through the defendant’s gun, that the class char-
acteristics were in complete agreement” (United States
v. Monteiro, 2006).
7. DOJ: The examiner testified that “I identified the
crime scene bullet as having been fired by the defen-
dant’s gun,” and this “means that the bullet recovered
at the crime scene and a bullet fired through the
defendant’s gun originated from the same source. That
all the class characteristics are in agreement and I
would not expect to find that same combination of
agreement in another source.”
Dependent measures. After the direct examination of the fire-
arm expert, participants were provided instruction on the standard
of proof (i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt) asked whether, given the
state’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, whether
they would convict the defendant (dichotomous “guilty” or “not
guilty”) and the likelihood that the defendant was the man who
fired the gun (0–100%). Participants then responded to six differ-
ent items that directly probed the credibility and reliability of the
firearm analysis presented in the case (e.g., “How reliable do you
think the firearm evidences is in this case?”) and in general (e.g.,
“In general, how often do firearm examiners make mistakes when
determining whether bullets were fired through the same gun?”).
These items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale with higher values
indicating high reliability/credibility/validity. A scale analysis re-
vealed a high degree of correlation among the six items, yielding
a Cronbach’s   .88. Thus, a composite score (referred to as
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“scientific credibility”) was created by summing the scores and
dividing by 6. Finally, participants were asked general questions
about their views about firearms evidence (“How often do firearm
examiners make mistakes?” 1  never to 7  always; “Do you
think firearm evidence is generally reliable [scientific]?” 1 
strongly agree to 7  strongly disagree; “Do you think guns leave
unique markings on discharged bullets/casings?” yes/I do not
know/no), as well as whether erroneous convictions or failing to
convict a guilty person cause more harm to society.
Finally, we included two additional questions: a 1–9 rating of
the strength of the case against the defendant; and “Which of the
following errors at trial do you believe causes more harm to
society” with “failing to convict a guilty person,” erroneously
convicting an innocent person” or “both are equally bad” as
responses. These questions were exploratory and we did not ana-
lyze them because the other dependent measures sufficiently ad-
dressed our research questions. All of the study materials, as well
as underlying data, are available on an Open Science Framework
website: https://osf.io/7kb43/.
Procedure. This study was approved by the Duke University
Institutional Review Board. The participants first provided in-
formed consent and responded to basic eligibility questions such as
age and U.S. citizenship, as well as questions regarding demo-
graphics, income, and political preferences. Each participant then
read the crime scenario describing a simple criminal offense and
police investigation. Participants were then randomly assigned to
one of the seven conclusion conditions described above. Finally,
participants completed the dependent measures and were thanked
for their participation. Average completion time was 780.61 s
(SD  1,862.88).
Results
At the conclusion of trial, 50.4% (n  715) of participants voted
to convict the defendant. The percentage of guilty verdicts within
each experimental condition appears in Figure 1.
Three separate binary logistic regressions were conducted to test
whether the proportion of guilty verdicts varied as a function of the
experimental conditions. All models use a bootstrap procedure
with 1,000 resamples to estimate standard errors of measurement.
Model 1 uses the “inconclusive” condition as the referent category,
Model 2 uses the “cannot be excluded” group as the referent
category, and Model 3 uses the “simple identification” group as the
referent category. Note that Model 1 tests Hypothesis 1, Model 2
tests Hypothesis 3, and Model 3 tests Hypotheses 2. The results of
all models are presented in Table 1.
With regard to Model 1, the model fit was statistically signifi-
cant (2  118.84, df  6, p  .001, Nagelkerke R2  0.11), and
every experimental condition was significantly more likely to
convict the defendant than the “inconclusive” condition. Indeed,
even the “cannot be excluded” condition which had the smallest
relative effect size, increased the odds of conviction by 2.5
(Exp[B]  2.497, 95% confidence interval [CI] [1.6, 3.9]) com-
pared to the inconclusive condition. Regardless of the specific
language used, the odds of conviction increased by 5 to 6 when a
match was declared relative to when an inconclusive was declared.
For example, the odds of conviction increase by 6 (Exp[B]  6.2,
95% CI [4.0, 9.6]) when a “simple match” is declared compared to
an inconclusive. This finding corroborates Hypothesis 1 that fire-
arm examiner testimony constitutes powerful evidence.
With regard to Model 2, the model fit was statistically signifi-
cant (2  29.1, df  5, p  .001, Nagelkerke R2  0.32), and
every experimental condition was significantly more likely to
convict the defendant than the “cannot be excluded” condition.
Participants in the “simple identification” condition were over two
times more likely to convict the defendant (Exp[B]  2.41, 95%
CI [1.6, 3.6]) than participants in the “cannot be excluded” con-
dition. Similarly, participants in the “ballistic certainty” condition
were 1.9 (95% CI [1.3, 2.8]) times more likely to convict, partic-
ipants in the “more likely than not” condition were 2.3 (95% CI
[1.6, 3.4]) times more likely to convict, participants in the “com-
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Figure 1. Proportion of guilty verdicts and mean likelihood ratings that the defendant fired the gun (with 95%
confidence intervals) in each experimental condition. DOJ  Department of Justice.
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plete agreement” condition were 1.8 (95% CI [1.2, 2.7]) times
more likely to convict, and participants in the “DOJ” condition
were 2.5 (95% CI [1.7, 3.7]) times more likely to convict than
participants in the “cannot be excluded” condition. This finding—
that the conviction rate is higher in all other groups than the
“cannot be excluded group”—corroborates Hypothesis 3.
With regard to Model 3, which uses the “simple identification”
as the referent category and omits the “inconclusive” and “cannot
be excluded” conditions, the model fit is not statistically signifi-
cant (2  3.7, df  4, p  .45, Nagelkerke R2  0.01). None of
the experimental conditions differed statistically. In other words,
variations to the language used to characterize the match did not
affect verdicts beyond declaring a “simple match.” This corrobo-
rates Hypothesis 2.
Participants’ ratings of the likelihood that the defendant was the
man who fired the gun (0–100%) was submitted to a one-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with follow-up Bonferroni-
adjusted contrasts. Note the cell means (and 95% CIs) are plotted
in Figure 1. The ANOVA was significant, F(6, 1408  36.78, p 
.001, and mirrored the results of the conviction rates. The likeli-
hood of the defendant’s guilt was lowest for the “inconclusive”
condition (M  37.65, SD  27.92) which was significantly different
from all other conditions (ps  .001, d  [1.1, 0.74]). The second
lowest-rated condition was the “cannot be excluded” condition (M 
58.75, SD  29.00), which was significantly lower than the “simple
identification,” t(397)  3.78, p  .003, d  0.37, “ballistic
certainty,” t(393)  3.40, p  .014, d  0.34, “more likely than
not,” t(392)  3.95, p  .002, d  0.37, and “DOJ,”
t(393)  3.89, p  .002, d  0.37, but not significantly different
from the “complete agreement” condition, t(387)  2.45, p  .30,
d  0.24.
A one-way ANOVA with scientific credibility as the dependent
variable was significant F(6, 1408  2.32, p  .031), though post
hoc Bonferroni contrasts revealed that the only statistically signif-
icant difference was that cannot be excluded (M  2.26, SD 
0.86) was viewed as more scientifically credible than the more
likely than not condition (M  2.0, SD  0.90; p  .049, 95% CI
[.0003, .5319], d  0.30). This finding indicates that scientific
credibility is not dependent on the outcome (e.g., an inconclusive
result is no less credible than an identification).
Finally, because no studies have used firearms and ballistic
forensic evidence as stimuli, participants’ general views of the
forensic discipline were measured. The data revealed that partici-
pants, on average, believe firearm experts do not make mistakes in
their analysis very often (M  2.66, SD  0.88, falling between
almost never and sometimes anchors on a 1–7 Likert scale with
lower scores indicating fewer mistakes). When asked to rate agree-
ment with whether firearm evidence is, in general, reliable, partici-
pants on average agreed (M  2.25, SD  1.24, falling between agree
and somewhat agree anchors on a 1–7 scale), and when asked to rate
agreement with whether firearm evidence is, in general, scientific,
participants also on average agreed (M  2.14, SD  1.13, falling
between agree and somewhat agree anchors on a 1–7 scale). An
overwhelming majority (84.5%) of participants (n  1200) stated that
they believe firearms leave unique markings on bullet casings; while
only 12.9% (n  183) said that they were unsure, and 2.6% (n  37)
said firearms do not leave unique markings.
Discussion
Despite how often firearm examiners testify in criminal trials,
there has yet to be an empirical study of how jurors perceive
firearm examiner testimony. In the first study to examine how
mock jurors perceive and evaluate firearm forensic evidence, the
data reveal that mock jurors accord significant weight to a firearm
examiner declaring match. This effect is seen in both guilty ver-
dicts and likelihood ratings that compare an inconclusive conclu-
sion to a match—regardless of the language used to describe the
match. Another key finding is that variations to the conclusion lan-
guage used to describe a match (i.e., not an inconclusive finding) do
not appear to matter to jurors, with the exception of the cannot
exclude language. Jurors were just as likely to convict and gave the
same likelihood ratings when the firearm examiner used “simple
identification” language as the other formulations. Although this
effect is consistent with other research in the domain of forensic
fingerprint evidence (Garrett & Mitchell, 2013), it calls into question
the approach of modifying the language used by firearm examiners in
an effort to avoid overstating to jurors. These data indicate that tweaks
to the conclusory language do not matter to jurors and produce no
meaningful effect on a trial outcome. The exception to this observa-
tion is the cannot exclude language; this approach does appear to have
an impact on jurors’ perception of firearm evidence.
There is an important caveat to these findings. The study did not
include a cross-examination condition, in which the expert is
probed regarding his or her conclusions and methodology. Re-
search on whether cross-examination is effective with regard to
Table 1
Study 1 Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Verdict (1  Guilty, 0  Not Guilty)
Experimental condition Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant 1.35 [.001] (0.17) 0.43 [.002] (0.14) 0.45 [.003] (0.15)
Cannot be excluded 0.92 [.001] (0.22)
Simple identification 1.79 [.001] (0.23) 0.88 [.001] (0.21)
Ballistic certainty 1.56 [.001] (0.22) 0.65 [.001] (0.20) 0.23 [.26] (0.21)
More likely than not 1.75 [.001] (0.223) 0.84 [.002] (0.202) 0.040 [.85] (0.207)
Complete agreement 1.53 [.001] (0.223) 0.61 [.002] (0.201) 0.267 [.20] (0.206)
Department of Justice 1.82 [.001] (0.22) 0.91 [.001] (0.20) 0.300 [.89] (0.21)
N 1,415 1,207 999
Nagelkerke R2 0.11 0.32 0.01
Note. Estimated raw maximum likelihood binary logistic regression weights, with standard errors in paren-
theses and p values in brackets.
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scientific evidence is mixed, sometimes finding no effect (e.g.,
Kovera, McAuliff, & Hebert, 1999) or an effect for certain types
of cross-examination (e.g., Austin & Kovera, 2015; Liberman et
al., 2008) or finding that the efficacy of cross-examination depends
on other individual (Scurich, 2015) or case-related factors
(Thompson & Scurich, 2019).
Whether cross-examination might affect the present results can
only be determined by additional empirical testing. Study 2 was
designed to address this limitation. It is worth noting that one judge
has expressed strong skepticism that cross-examination would have
its intended effect in the context of firearm examiner testimony:
[T]he Court strongly disagrees with the government that cross-
examination could cure any reliability issues created by a source attribu-
tion statement . . . this discipline and the disputes surrounding it seem far
too complex for a series of questions on cross-examination to allow a full
understanding of the limitations of the field. . . . It would be fanciful to
conclude that the normal adversarial process would enable a lay jury
to adequately understand these issues, and it is similarly unrealistic to
conclude that the average attorney in the average trial would be able to
raise these issues in front of the jury in this fashion, particularly when this
issue would be one among many issues to be presented to the jury in a
trial. (United States v. Tibbs, 2019, pp. 52–53)
Study 2
There were two primary objectives of Study 2. The first objec-
tive was to attempt to replicate the findings in Study 1, in particular
the finding that an identification increased guilty verdicts (com-
pared to an inconclusive result) and the cannot exclude language
reduced guilty verdicts compared to an identification. Replication
in psychology is exceedingly important (see Open Science Col-
laboration, 2015).
The second objective was to enhance the ecological validity of
the experiment by including a cross-examination condition (see
Koehler & Meixner, 2017). Beyond ecological validity concerns, a
cross-examination condition was important to include because it
could potentially explain the null results for language variation
observed in Study 1: If participants were predisposed to believe
firearm examination is valid science, and no challenge to the
testimony is presented, then it would not be surprising that varia-
tions to the language used to express the conclusion had no effect
because there was no evidence presented that might alter their
preconception. Alternatively, it is also possible that cross-
examination, even if presented, would not affect perceptions of
firearm examiner testimony. As the judge in Tibbs speculated,
firearm examiner testimony may be too engrained in the psyche of
the lay public and otherwise too technical to be adequately cri-
tiqued via cross-examination to affect verdicts. Whether cross-
examination that challenges the firearm examiner has any impact
alone or as a function of the conclusion language used by the
expert is an empirical question that was tested in this study.
Study 2 registered the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The findings from Study 1 would replicate in
that the identification conclusion increased guilty verdicts and
likelihood of commission ratings relative to the cannot be
excluded and inconclusive conditions.
Hypothesis 2: Cross-examination would lower guilty verdicts
and likelihood of commission ratings.
Hypothesis 3: An interaction between conclusion condition
and cross-examination, such that cross-examination would
have no effect on guilty verdicts and likelihood of commission
ratings when the conclusion is Inconclusive, because those
decisions/ratings are already low, but cross-examination
would significantly decrease guilty verdicts/likelihood of
commission ratings for the identification and cannot be ex-
cluded conditions.
Method
Participants. Consistent with Study 1 and the related statis-
tical power analysis, 200 participants per cell were required, for a
total N  1260. Participants were recruited using Qualtrics Panels
and completed the survey online. Participants were terminated
from the study and excluded from analyses if they did not pass a
comprehension check and an attention check, if they were not a
U.S. citizen, or if they came from suspicious, duplicate geoloca-
tions (see Oppenheimer et al., 2009). The final sample was com-
prised of 1,260 participants aged 18–92 (Mdn  46, interquartile
range  29). The study was balanced with respect to gender (48%
self-identified as male; 52% as female). Participants self-identified
as 13.2% Black, 5.3% Asian, 62.6% White, 17.1% Hispanic, 0.2%
Native American or Pacific Islander, and the rest selected other.
With respect to education, 58.5% had a 2-year college degree or
less, 27.6% had at least 4-year college degree, and 13.9% had a
postgraduate degree.
Participants were asked to self-identify their political prefer-
ences: 13.0% identified as “very conservative,” 18.0% identified
as “somewhat conservative,” 38.4% identified as “middle of the
road,” 18.1% identified as “somewhat liberal,” and 12.5% identi-
fied as “very liberal.” Twenty-nine percent had a self-reported
annual household income of less than $20,000 and 16.9% had an
income above $100,000.
Materials. The same case materials from Study 1 were used in
Study 2 but with a couple of important modifications. First, there
were only three variations to the language used to describe the
match in Study 2:
1. Inconclusive: The examiner testified that “there was not
sufficient agreement among the characteristics to determine
that the toolmarks have been produced by the same tool.”
2. Cannot be excluded: The examiner testified “the defen-
dant’s gun cannot be excluded as the gun that fired the bullet
recovered at the crime scene,” which means that “we ob-
serve some agreement of a combination of individual char-
acteristics suggesting that the toolmarks have been produced
by the same tool.”
3. Simple identification: The examiner testified that “I identi-
fied the crime scene bullet as having been fired by the
defendant’s gun.”
Second, some participants (randomly determined) heard cross-
examination of the firearm examiner. This cross-examination was
culled from transcripts of actual testimony given during cross-
examination. The cross-examination presented to participants
(where Q represents questions from the defense attorney and A
represents answers from the firearm examiner) was as follows:
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Q: You examined the crime scene bullet and test-fired bul-
lets from the defendant’s gun, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: But that required some interpretation, didn’t it?
A: Well, yes, there is always an element of interpretation.
Q: It was not a perfect match, was it?
A: There were clear points of comparison on which there
was consistency.
Q: But there were differences between the two bullets when
you compared them under the microscope, right?
A: There are always some minor differences when you
compare bullets under a microscope, but in my judgment
the differences were not meaningful differences.
Q: Just to be clear, you are saying that there are differences—
individual differences—between the crime scene bullet and
the bullets test fired through the defendant’s gun?
A: Yes, that is correct.
Q: But you do not consider those differences to be “mean-
ingful,” in your words?
A: As I said, there are always some minor differences when
you compare bullets under a microscope. But a number
of the individual characteristics were identical.
Q: There aren’t any formal rules in your field about what
constitutes a match? You just rely on your own personal
judgment?
A: There is no formula for what constitutes a match because
each case is unique. I rely on my knowledge, training and
experience in the field to make the right judgment.
Q: So It’s a match because you say it’s a match?
A: Yes. I’m a certified expert in this field.
Q: Have you ever committed an error in your work?
A: No. I have passed all of my proficiency tests with perfect
accuracy. Never made an error.
Q: Have you ever read a scientific study that reports an error
rate for firearm examiners?
A: Maybe. I recall reading some of those studies. I believe
those studies find an error rate between 0 and 1%, but as
I said, my error rate is 0%.
Q: Are you aware of the 2016 report by the President’s
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, which
said that firearm analysis is not scientifically valid?
A: No. I have not read that report.
Q: Are you aware that mainstream scientists do not consider
firearm examination to be science?
A: No. I am not aware of that and I do not agree with it.
Q: Nothing further at this time.
Thus, Study 2 used a 3 (Language: inconclusive, cannot ex-
clude, or simple identification)  2 (Cross-Examination: present
or absent) between-participants factorial design. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of six possible cells.
After reading the cross-examination transcript, participants were
provided with judicial instruction on the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard of proof and asked whether they would convict the
defendant (dichotomous “guilty” or “not guilty”), and the likeli-
hood that the defendant was the man who fired the gun (0–100%
likelihood). Participants then responded to six different items that
probed the credibility and reliability of the firearm analysis pre-
sented in the case and in general. A scale analysis revealed a high
degree of correlation among the six items, yielding a Cronbach’s
  .854. Thus, a composite score (referred to as “scientific
credibility”) was created by summing the scores and dividing by 6.
Finally, participants were asked general questions about their
views about firearms evidence (“How often do firearm examiners
make mistakes?” 1  never to 7  always; “Do you think firearm
evidence is generally reliable[scientific]?” 1  strongly agree to
7  strongly disagree; “Do you think guns leave unique markings
on discharged bullets/casings?” yes/I do not know/no), as well as
whether erroneous convictions or failing to convict a guilty person
cause more harm to society. All of the study materials, as well as
underlying data, are available on an Open Science Framework
website, https://osf.io/gkjts/.
Procedure. The same procedure was followed in Study 2 as in
Study 1. After providing consent and responding to eligibility and
background questions, participants read the crime scenario de-
scribing a simple criminal offense and police investigation and
then the trial transcripts. Participants then completed the dependent
measures. Average completion time was 904.72 s (SD  1465.30).
Results
At the conclusion of trial, 41.9% (n  528) of participants voted
to convict the defendant. The percentage of guilty verdicts within
each experimental condition appears in Figure 2.
A binary logistic regression model was tested with conclusion
(inconclusive condition as the reference group), cross-examination
(no cross-examination as the reference group), and their interaction
as predictors and guilty verdict as the dependent measure. The
overall model was significant (2  105.59, df  5, p  .001,
Nagelkerke R2  0.11). See Table 2 for regression output. There
was a significant main effect for conclusion (p  .001), with
participants in both the cannot exclude condition (Exp[B]  1.90,
95% CI [1.24, 2.91], p  .001) and identification condition
(Exp[B]  4.65, 95% CI [3.05, 7.08], p  .001) being significantly
more likely to vote to convict than those in the Inconclusive
condition. Moreover, participants were significantly less likely to
vote to convict the defendant in the cannot exclude condition
compared to the identification condition (Exp[B]  0.41, 95% CI
[0.28, 0.61], p  .001). These findings supported Hypothesis 1 and
replicated the two findings from Study 1, which are that the
identification condition produced significantly more guilty ver-
dicts than the Inconclusive condition and the cannot exclude
condition produced significantly less guilty verdicts than the iden-
tification condition. The main effect for cross-examination, how-
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ever, was not statistically significant effect (p  .151), nor was the
interaction term (p  .831).
Participants’ ratings of the likelihood that the defendant was the
man who fired the gun were examined next. A 3(Conclusion) 
2(Cross-Examination) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect
for conclusion, F(2, 1254)  64.77, p  .001, p2  0.094 such that
the identification conclusion yielded the highest likelihood ratings
(M  68.89, SE  1.35), followed by cannot be excluded (M 
59.73, SE  1.35), and then inconclusive (M  47.181, SE 
1.35). This main effect is consistent with the main effect detected
for guilty verdicts. Post hoc comparisons with Bonferroni adjust-
ments revealed that each of these marginal means were signifi-
cantly different from each other at the p  .001 level, with
identification yielding larger likelihood estimates than the Incon-
clusive wording (Cohen’s d  0.77) and cannot be excluded (d 
0.34), which in turn was significantly higher than inconclusive
(d  .44). Again, this supported Hypothesis 1 and replicated
findings from Study 1.
Similar to the pattern observed with guilty verdicts, the main effect
for cross-examination was not statistically significant, F(1, 1254) 
3.16, p  .076, p2  0.003. However, in contrast to the pattern of
guilty verdicts, the interaction between cross-examination and con-
clusion was statistically significant, F(2, 1254)  3.97, p  .019,
p2  0.006. The means (and 95% CIs) are plotted in Figure 3.
As is apparent in Figure 3, when there is no cross-examination,
there is a difference between each of the three conclusion condi-
tions; however, when cross-examination is present there is a dif-
ference between the inconclusive conclusion but not the identifi-
cation or cannot exclude conditions. In other words, cannot
exclude and identification are perceived as different conclusions
without cross-examination but they are indistinguishable when
cross-examination is present. Although this pattern of results is
statistically significant, it is important to point out that the effect is
quite small in practical terms, a point we return in the discussion
section.
A 3  2 ANOVA with scientific credibility as the dependent
measure detected a main effect for conclusion, F(2, 1254)  7.83,
p  .001, p2  0.012, and a main effect for cross-examination,
F(1, 1254)  33.59, p  .001, p2  0.026, but the interaction was
not statistically significant, F(2, 1254)  2.48, p  .084, p2 
0.004. The mean scientific credibility values for inconclusive,
cannot exclude, and identification are 5.52 (SD  .97), 5.56 (SD 
.92), 5.77 (SD  1.04), respectively, and both inconclusive and
cannot exclude were significantly less scientifically credible than
Figure 2. Proportion of guilty verdicts (with 95% confidence intervals) in each experimental condition.
Table 2
Study 2 Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Verdict (1  Guilty, 0  Not Guilty)
Exp(B) 95% CI for Exp(B)
Experimental condition (SE) Lower Upper
Constant 0.34 [.001] (0.163)
Simple identification 4.65 [.001] (0.22) 3.05 7.08
Cannot be excluded 1.90 [.003] (0.22) 1.24 2.91
Cross-examination 1.38 [.15] (0.22) 0.89 2.13
Simple Identification  Cross Examination 0.84 [.55] (0.30) 0.47 1.50
Cannot Be Excluded  Cross Examination 0.89 [.69] (0.30) 0.49 1.60
N 1,260
Nagelkerke R2 0.11
Note. CI  confidence interval. p Values in brackets.
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identification (pbonferroni  .001, and pbonferroni  .004, respec-
tively). When cross-examination is absent, the mean scientific
credibility rating is 5.77 (SD  0.90) whereas the mean scientific
credibility decreased (5.46 [SD  1.03]) when cross-examination
was present. Again, this difference is statistically significant (as
evidenced by the main effect reported above), but it is quite
meager in terms of its practical significance.
Participants’ general attitudes toward firearms forensic evidence
were also measured. Consistent with Study 1, participants, on
average, believe firearm experts rarely make mistakes in their
analysis very often (M  2.59, SD  0.97, between almost never
and sometimes anchors), and that firearm evidence in general is
reliable (M  2.50, SD  1.34, between agree and somewhat
agree) and based on scientific principles (M  2.47, SD  1.26,
between agree and somewhat agree). Finally, 83.8% of partici-
pants (n  1,056) stated that they believe firearms leave unique
markings on bullet casings; 13.7% (n  173) said that they were
unsure, and 2.5% (n  31) said firearms do not leave unique
markings. These numbers are nearly identical to responses from
Study 1, suggesting that they are fairly robust.
General Discussion
These results can be viewed with a mix of optimism and
pessimism. On the one hand, forensic experts can use wording that
more cautiously describes their conclusions without harming their
credibility or conviction rate. Thus, there is little to no cost in
avoiding misleading or overstated conclusion language that im-
plies a categorical association between evidence. On the other
hand, it is unfortunate that the more cautious and tempered con-
clusion language did not result in higher credibility ratings for the
expert or reliability and scientific ratings for the evidence.
In general, participants seemed to hold firearm forensic analysis
in high regard, believing errors do not happen very often, and
agreeing that it is scientific and reliable. In fact, the vast majority
of participants believe that firearms make unique marks on bullets
and casings. As a result, those participants may assume that any
conclusion reached, however it is phrased, may involve a unique
and infallible “match.”
The modifications to forensic firearms analysis conclusions that
have been adopted by federal judges and the DOJ may be ineffec-
tive because the modifications do not address the error rates and
the limitations of firearms analysis, in a way that could counter
participants’ prior assumption that firearms conclusions are largely
infallible and reach some sort of “perfect match.” Using the phrase
“reasonable degree of ballistic certainty” is itself unclear; it has no
technical meaning and nor is it common in everyday usage. In
contrast, the phrase “more likely than not” did convey an actual
probability, but not one that an expert can actually explain or
defend because it is not supported by any empirical data.
Another approach is to provide jurors with more information
about the reliability of the method. Presenting information about
empirical evidence concerning error rates, proficiency of firearms
examiners (Mitchell & Garrett, 2019), or presenting information in
a quantitative form based on actual population data (Garrett et al.,
2018), might all better improve the accuracy of jury decision
making. Jurors are highly receptive to such information (Mitchell
& Garrett, 2019). To be sure, research suggests that jurors can
sometimes struggle to understand and amalgamate error rate in-
formation, particularly if it is not accompanied by an account of
how forensic science errors can occur (see Scurich, 2015).
Cross-examination did not help jurors to consistently discount
firearms conclusions, consistent with prior work showing mixed
effects of cross-examination on jury perceptions of strength of
evidence. Indeed, the cannot exclude and identification conclu-
sions were indistinguishable when cross-examination was present.
One reason may be that, as one might expect, during cross-
Figure 3. Mean likelihood ratings that the defendant fired the gun (with 95% confidence intervals) in each
experimental condition.
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examination the expert did not disavow the work, and instead
continued to maintain that, based on training and experience, the
same conclusion should be reached. The cross-examination per-
mitted the defense counsel to highlight certain limitations of the
firearms comparison method, but the expert largely stuck to his
guns, as it were. The results suggest that the judge in Tibbs may
have been right to be skeptical that cross-examination is the
solution to the problem of overstated firearms testimony (United
States v. Tibbs, 2019, pp. 52–53).
A challenge for a discipline like firearms comparison, is that the
error rate of firearms examiners is not sufficiently well understood.
As one judge noted,
after extensive review of the testimony of the expert witnesses and of
the studies about which those experts testified, the undersigned finds
it difficult to conclude that the existing studies provide a sufficient
basis to accept the low error rates for the discipline that these studies
purport to establish. (United States v. Tibbs, 2019, p. 28)
Further basic research must be conducted to measure error rates in
the firearms discipline, and such work is apparently underway
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2020). Similarly,
as with any other type of forensic pattern comparison analysis, the
method can be subject to error due to cognitive bias (Kassin, Dror,
& Kukucka, 2013). However, studies have not been done exam-
ining the effects of task irrelevant information or other biasing
information on firearms examiners. Nor have studies been done
regarding whether reliability of firearms evidence varies given
different levels in evidence quality and difficulty (Dror & Scurich,
in press).
Studies have found that individual juror perceptions of the
strength of the prosecution case strongly predict their guilt verdicts
(Bornstein & Green, 2011). Across conclusions that indicate a
match, approximately 60% of participants in each condition be-
lieved the single piece of firearms comparison evidence met the
reasonable doubt threshold to convict the defendant. Like the
participants in this study, lay jurors in a criminal case have no
reason not to assume that a firearms expert makes a highly reliable
match based on “unique” markings. Nor can existing research
provide them more calibrated information, because as noted, the
strengths and the weaknesses of the methods that firearms experts
use have not been adequately tested empirically. Jurors can vary
the weight that they place on forensic evidence that they would
otherwise treat as extremely probative, such as fingerprint evi-
dence, if they receive quantitative information regarding profi-
ciency, or the reliability of a particular forensic examiner (Mitchell
& Garrett, 2019) or regarding a forensic conclusion (Garrett et al.,
2018). Perhaps judges or lawyers can similarly use such quantita-
tive information to inform jurors regarding firearms evidence.
Doing so, however, will require better underlying research on the
basic reliability and validity of firearms comparison methods.
Limitations and Future Directions
The current studies have several limitations that need to be taken
into account. The stimulus materials presented an abbreviated
version of a criminal trial in written format. This deviates from an
actual criminal trial in many obvious ways. For instance, in an
actual trial, jurors would watch live testimony from a firearm
examiner and likely be furnished with images of the ammunition in
question. A nontrivial amount of time would be spent in the
expert’s qualifications and training. Jurors would deliberate and
reach a verdict, rather than offer individual guilty verdicts. It is not
clear how these differences might impact the observed results.
Future research should include video testimony so to better mimic
the real-world condition in which jurors view the expert testifying
(e.g., Scurich, 2018), and include more information regarding the
expert’s background and training (Koehler, Schweitzer, Saks, &
McQuiston, 2016). Generalizing the present findings to different
cases and different contexts should be done cautiously.
In addition to enhancing ecological validity, future research
might examine if jurors are sensitive to the differences between
class, subclass, and individual characteristics. According to the
AFTE theory, a “match” can only be declared when there is
sufficient agreement of individual characteristics. But it is cer-
tainly possible that jurors assume that agreement of class or
subclass characteristics is sufficient to declare a “match.” This
speculation is supported in part because the stimulus materials in
Study 1 (Conditions 6 and 7) inappropriately said that an identi-
fication was reached on the basis of class characteristics and this
apparently did not affect verdicts. A more careful empirical test of
this possibility is necessary, and particularly important as courts
start to consider limiting firearm examiner testimony to class or
subclass characteristics only.
Conclusion
While several federal judges and the DOJ have tempered lan-
guage that firearms experts use in court, adopting types of modi-
fied conclusion language endorsed by practitioners did not affect
guilty verdicts. In contrast, a conclusion that an examiner simply
“cannot exclude the defendant’s gun,” a much more cautious
conclusion, imposed by at least one judge, did affect guilty ver-
dicts. These findings suggest that many judicial and prosecution-
driven interventions to limit conclusion language for firearms
testimony are not likely to be effective. Any courtroom interven-
tions must be quite forceful to be effective, because as the studies
here revealed, laypeople place great weight on firearms testimony.
Judicial actors require adequate research to assess the reliability of
firearms comparison methods, to use that research to more care-
fully inform jurors in criminal cases. Until that foundational re-
search is conducted, however, more forceful judicial instructions
may be warranted.
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